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The Evolution of Law: Continued
Alan Watson
In my book The Evolution of Law' I sought to give a general theory of
legal evolution based on detailedlegal examples from which generalizations
could be drawn, offering as few examples as were consistent with my case
in orderto presentas clear a pictureas possible. I was well aware as I was
writing that some critics would regard the examples as mere isolated
aberrationsand for them and for other readerswho, whether convinced of
the thesis or not, would like furtherevidence, I want here to bring forward
a few extra significant examples.
I

In the first chapterI wantedto show that it is, above all, lawyers thinking
aboutlaw, not societal conditions, thatdeterminesthe shape of legal change
in developed legal systems. I chose to show as the main example that it was
the thoughtpatternof the Romanjurists, ratherthanconditionsin the society
at large, that determinedthe origins and nature of the individual Roman
contracts,and that the jurists were largely unaffectedby society's realities.
Of course, social, economic, political and religious factors, did have an
impact but to an extent that was very much less than their general
importance in society. What was true for one main-perhaps the most
original and the most important-branch of law, developed over centuries
by jurists in one of the world's most innovative systems, is also true it will
now be argued, for law in general developed over centuries by judges, in
another of the world's innovative secular systems, the English medieval
common law.
In contrastto my handlingof the Roman law of contractI do not want to
producea radicallynew theoryof the developmentof the common law. That
is why I omitted this example from the book. RatherI want to demonstrate
that my general thesis is implicit in standardaccounts of the growth of the
common law, especially as exemplified by the best-knownmodernaccount,
Alan Watson is University Professorof Law, University of Pennsylvania.
I am grateful to my friends, Stephen B. Burbank,John W. Cairns, Michael H. Hoeflich, and Peter
Krause, who criticised drafts of this paper.
1. Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Watson,
Evolution].
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S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundationsof the CommonLaw.2 I would not
want to accuse Milsom of sharingmy viewpoint on legal evolution but, on
very many pages on individualpoints and in the picturecontainedoverall in
his book, his argumentstrikinglyconfirms my thesis; assuming, of course,
he is correct in what he tells us of the history of English law.
Thus, in discussing feudal tenures-and for long feudal law was at the
heart of the English legal system-he can say: 'The military tenures, of
uncertainvalue as a provisionfor warfare,broughtwith them a logic which
was to generate anachronismsthroughoutour history.'3 After the Norman
Conquest, almost all those who held land directly from the King held it by
knight service which entailed the obligationof providinga fixed numberof
fully armedhorsemenfor forty days per year. The cavalry was so recruited
for almost a century- though the militarydisadvantagesof such a system
are obvious -but eventually money payments called scutage were substituted. Though knight service was abolished in 1660 many of the incidents
of the tenureresultingfrom its militaryorigins remaineduntil this century.4
Again, at the low legal level of manorcourtsand manorlaw Milsom writes:
'Some of this law was to perish, some to live to a sad old age as what came
to be called copyhold.'5Of the defects of copyhold many have written,6but
much of the land of England was held by copyhold until 1925. 'Although
copyholdnow [in the early 17thcentury]had equal protection,it retainedits
separate identity for three useless centuries, providing a measure of
economic obstruction,traps for conveyancers, and puzzles for the courts.
These puzzles concernedsuch mattersas the entailingof copyhold, and they
were of absorbinglegal interest.Todaytheironly value is as an object lesson
in the greatintellectualdifficulty a legal system can encounterwhen it seeks
to rejoinmatterswhich became separatedfor reasonswhich are extinct.'7On
the evolution of land ownershiphe remarks:'It is hardto say which story is
the more extraordinary:the evolution of the fee simple as ownership, with
only its name and its necessary words of limitation to remind us of its
tenurialbeginnings;or the series of seeming accidents which producedthe
fee tail. But this juridical monster, beyond the desires of donors seven
hundredyears ago, beyond the intention of the legislator and far beyond

2. S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Toronto, 2nd ed.,

1981) [hereinaftercited as Foundations].
3. Ibid. at 20.
4. See e.g. A. W. B. Simpson, Introduction to the History of the Land Law (Oxford,

1961) 8.
5. Foundations, supra note 2 at 21.
6. See e.g. E. H. Burn, Cheshire's Modern Real Property (London, 11th ed., 1982) 24;

R. E. Megarryand H. W. R. Wade, TheLaw of Real Property(London, 3rded., 1966)
29; (5th ed., 1984) 32.

7. Foundations, supra note 2 at 165.

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

539

reason, is with us yet.'8 'The settlement,by which an owner of propertycan
divide the ownershipin time between beneficiarieswho will take one after
another,is the most distinctivecreationof the common law, and perhapsthe
most unfortunate . . . For the historian the special interest of the

development is its repeated demonstrationof the strength of purely legal
phenomena.Results were reachedwhich, althoughabsorbedand exploited,
cannot have been desired.'9
Examplescan also be taken from the law of torts. Milsom points out that
in the fourteenthcentury a suit in the royal courts against a blacksmithfor
negligence in shoeing a horse had to allege breachof the king's peace, and
thatthis situationwas remediedaround1370 when writs were issued which
did not allege such a breach. 0 But the vi et armis writ for cattle trespass'had
been extended to the case of strayinganimals when wrongs still could not
come into royal courts unless contra pacem was alleged; and in this case the

writ was never modified as was the smith's to make an honest action on the
case. Nor was this a curiosity withoutconsequence:in the twentiethcentury
the defendantowner would still be liable withoutthe affirmativeshowing of
fault which became necessaryin an action on the case.'" And again writing
of the period before 1370: 'Or consider the sale of a diseased horse
deceitfully warrantedsound. As early as 1307 a buyerhad sued in the king's
court, but again only because he was on the king's service. The ordinary
plaintiff could hardly represent the wrong as contra pacem: but it might

seem capriciousthat he could not get to the king's court when the smith's
ill-used customer could.'12 Slightly further on: 'Trespass, then, lost its
originalsense by being identifiedwith trespassvi et armis and distinguished
from case. It was from that distinction that the modern sense of trespass
grew; and to hindsight the process seems perverse. When contra pacem lost

its jurisdictional importanceabout 1370, its importancein the matter of
processunhappilysurvived;and a chance of reunitingthe law of wrongs was
missed. A second chance came in 1504, when the same process was
extended to all trespass actions. Contra pacem was thereafter without

consequences in the real world except for a nominal fine to the king. But it
was too late. The two categories existed in lawyers' heads, as the statute
itself shows. It was certain therewas a distinctioneven if nobodyknew what
it was; and a distinction is never without consequence in a law court.'"3
Discussing the system of civil judicatureas it was around 1300 Milsom
writes: 'The system was to make some sense until the sixteenthcentury, to
last until the nineteenth, and to leave its imprint in every common law
8. Ibid. at 177.
9. Ibid. at 166.
10. Ibid. at 290f.
11. Ibid. at 291.
12. Ibid. at 292f.
13. Ibid. at 308f.
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jurisdictiontoday.14 Significantly for us, as we shall see, he adds: 'But it
was not devised as a national system of civil judicature. It was an
accumulationof expedientsas more and more kinds of disputeswere drawn
first to a jurisdictionaland then also to a geographicalcentre. One resultwas
to invest the machinerywhich controlledjurisdiction with an importance
that was to outlive and to overshadowits reason.' And on the fact that, in
general, courts could not act without special authority,namely a writ from
chancery in each case, he says: 'This jurisdictionalaccident was to be of
growing consequence. In the middle ages it hamperedthe expansion of the
common law by restrictingthe kinds of claim that could be broughtbefore
the court. If ordinary private disputes had continued to come before a
jurisdictionlike that of the eyre, to which plaintiffs had direct access, the
commonlaw could have reacteddirectlyto changingneeds; and in particular
it could have continuedto admitkinds of claims familiarin local courtsbut
at first regardedas inappropriatefor royal judges. But plaintiffs could not
get to the courtwithouta chancerywrit, and the formulaeof the writs, most
of which were highly practicalresponses to the needs of thirteenth-century
litigants, became an authoritativecanon which could not easily be alteredor
addedto. Importantareas, some new but many older than the king's courts
themselves, were in this way cut off from legal regulation, and they could
laterbe reachedonly by devious ingenuityin the common law courts, or by
resortingto the chancellor's equitablejurisdiction,to which once more the
litigant could directly complain ....

All this was no more than the

constrictionof red tape. But so completedid it become thatin the eighteenth
century it engendered a purely formalistic view of the law and of its
developmentwhich has lasted until our own day.'15
Speaking specifically of 'trespass', but his meaning can be generalized,
Milsom wrote: 'The law itself was seen as based, not upon elementary
ideas, but upon the common law writs, as consisting in a rangeof remedies
which had as it were come down from the skies. If a case fell within the
scope of one writ, then in general no other writ could be proper.'16
Many otherpassages could be cited to the same effect. Whetheran action
was available dependedon a system (of writs) which had lost its meaning
centuries before; whole parts of the law remained in effect though the
societal structureat theirbase had disappearedcenturiesbefore;the scope of
a remedy-whether for instancefault was an essential of a particulartortdepended and may still depend on devices and dodges invented centuries
ago to meet difficulties dead centuriesago. Of one distinction, as we have
seen, Milsom remarksthat it 'seems capricious'. So it does, and so does the
legal resultin the other instancesquoted;but only if we look at the law from
society's point of view, from a considerationof the economic and social
realities. It is not capriciousif we look at law from the point of view of the
14. Ibid. at 33.
15. Ibid. at 36.
16. Ibid. at 309.
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legal elite, in this instancethe judges, makingthe law. 'But practitionersand
judges do not normally give a pin for legal development. Their duty is to
these clients and the proper disposition of this case', says Milsom.'7
Precisely. Judgescannotdispose of a case just as they wish. They are boxed
in, especially in a system based on precedent,by formerdecisions whether
relatingto jurisdictionor to points of substantivelaw. Writingspecifically
of land settlementsMilsom declares:'The rules underwhich so much of the
wealth of England was held for so much of its history were made and
unmadeby these processes, so extraordinarywhen looked at as a whole and
backwards,so reasonablestep by forwardstep.'18In the attemptto give a
decent remedy in a particularsituationthe judges may make mattersworse
both by complicatingthe law and by directingits course for the future.19In
judge-madelaw, the inputof society at large-both in termsof the views of
the inhabitantsand of economic interests-is different from what it is in
jurist-made law. At the very least the case comes before the judge only
because there is a problem, and the issues are put vehemently-as
vehemently at least as the system allows-by the interested party. But
society's input is not matched by the outcome. That is determinedby the
judges' view of the law. It cannot surprisethat there are rules of judging,
that judges are blinkeredby law that they see as existing in its own right,
even if they can at times twist it to a ratherdifferent shape. If there is any
cause for surpriseit is-as with the Roman law of contract-the acquiescence in this type of legal evolution by the ruling elite and society at large.
But, then, if therewas not this acquiescencemost of the time, law would not
evolve as largely autonomous,involved with its own culture, in the way that
I claim.
The natureof legal evolution in Englandby judicial precedentleads to a
fundamentalquestion (which will not be answered here). Because of its
emphasison developmentby precedentand in ignoringRomanlaw, English
law came eventually to be unique in Western Europe with different legal
rules, divisions of law, legal structures,systematization,and hierarchiesof
law-makers.What does this tell one about society in general and the ruling
elite? Was England really different in social structureand values from the
rest of Europe?And if it was, what were the significant social differences?
Saxony, for example, taking the other route of building upon the Corpus
Juris Civilis, was by the middle of the nineteenthcentury the possessor of
a much more sophisticated, systematic, analytical system of law than
Englandthen had. Does this tell one anythingexcept aboutlaw? I doubtthat
it does until someone documentsthe differencesin the societies that account
for the difference in legal approach.What is one to make of the fact thatfor
a long time, from 1714 until the deathof King William IV in 1837, the king
of England was the king of Hannoverin Germanywhere a very different
17. Ibid. at 77.
18. Ibid. at 199.
19. For a particularexample see Watson, Evolution, supra note 1 at 35ff.
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legal system prevailed? Even then Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland,
became King of Hannover and reigned until 1851. And was England, by
avoiding the Reception of Roman law, more innovative in law than were the
other Western European states? If it was, what meaning does this have?
Law has, as Martin Kriegier emphasizes, a 'pervasive traditionality', that
to a considerable extent the legal past is a normatively and authoritatively
significant part of the legal present.20 As he puts it, 'In every complex
tradition, such as law, what is present at any particular time is the currently
authoritative or persuasive residue of deposits made over generations,
recording and transmitting inconsistent and often competing values, beliefs
and views of the world. Current law is full of elements caught in and
transmitted by legal tradition over generations. Dig into this diachronic
quarry at any particular time, and the present will be a revealing mixture of
fossils, innovations of the long gone, and recent deposits.' This incoherence
is very obvious, as we have seen, in a system such as that of England built
up by judicial precedent. It also appears with astonishing clarity in a federal
country where neighboring provinces or states, having much in common,
build up over centuries very different legal rules on matters of fundamental
concern. The law of the Swiss cantons at the time of the preparation of the
Swiss Civil Code, Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch (ZGB), is a good example.
Virgile Rossel (who prepared the French translation) was one of the two
rapporteurs for the French language at the debate of the Conseil National in
1905 on the draft code of Eugen Huber, and he emphasised that the
differences existing between the cantonal laws then in force had, almost
always, origins that could not be explained by religion, language or even by
race. Then he continued:
Whatis, for example, the matrimonialregime that is the nearestto thatof the cantonof
Neuchatel? Do not search too close by: go, on the contrary, to the extreme eastern
frontier of Switzerland, in the canton of the Grisons! Perhaps you think that the
matrimonialregime of the canton of Thurgauand even the whole economy of its civil
legislations is stronglyattachedto the neighboringcanton of Zurich?The analogies are
much more strikingbetween the code of Thurgauand the code Napoleon than between
the same code of Thurgauand that which Bluntschli drew up. Gentlemen, I borrow
some other perceptions,no less characteristic,from the message of the federal council
of 24 November 1896:
'The cantonallaw gives the advantageto the sons to the detrimentof daughtersin the
cantons of Lucerne, Fribourg,Zug and Thurgau. Schaffhausenand Neuchatel give to
ascendants and collaterals the right of propertyreturn according to the origin of the
goods. Appenzell, Argau, Basel, Fribourgand Solothurnmake no distinctionbetween
the paternaland the maternallines. Geneva, Thurgau,the Bernese Jura, SanktGallen,
Vaud, Fribourg, Ticino and Solothurn make of ascendants a special class of heirs.
Fideicommissarysubstitutionsare forbidden in Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Lucerne,
Glaris, in the Grisons and in Zug. Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Neuchatel, Appenzell,
Aargau, Valais, Bern, Vaud, Glaris and Fribourggive the illegitimatechild a share in
the inheritanceto his father. Zurich, Geneva, Thurgau, Soleure, Ticino, Neuchatel,
Sankt Gallen and the Bernese Jura have permittedadoption. Bern, Thurgau, Aargau,

20. M. Krygier, 'Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory: A Response to Alan Hunt',
OxfordJournal of Legal Studies 7 (1987) 26.
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Geneva, Soleure, Neuchatel, FribourgandTicino give the mother,on the father'sdeath,
the paternalpower and the guardianshipof the children. Geneva and Nidwalden have
institutedthe family council whose task is to look afterthe tutor's administration.In the
realmof the law of property,we find a landregistryin Basel-city, Soleure, in the canton
of Vaud, in Schwytz and Nidwalden . . .' I cut short my quotation. But is that not the

best demonstrationof what is artificial and fortuitousin our Swiss law? This mosaic,
which seems the result of fantasy and chance at least as much as of ethical or moral
influences, ought not to fill us with such venerationthat we do not dare to lay handson
it.21

(Here we are concerned with the fact of the incoherence of legal rules in
neighboring cantons or states in a federal nation, not with explaining the
causes of the differences. But investigation would show that many of the
differences had their origins in particular events which were not deeply
rooted in local consciousness. An individual dispute might require court
resolution. And the court's decision might be followed in subsequent cases
as being the best evidence of local custom, whether or not any local custom
existed. A similar neighboring state might reach a contrary decision,
possibly for reasons inhering in the particular case, and that decision in time
21. Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung,
Nationalrat (1905) 436.
Quel est, par exemple, le r6gime matrimonialqui se rapprochele plus de celui du
canton de Neuchatel? Ne cherchez pas trop pres; allez au contrairea l'extreme
frontiereorientalede la Suisse, dans le cantondes Grisons! Vous pensez peut-etre
que le regime matrimonialdu canton de Thurgovie et meme toute l'6conomie de
sa legislation civile le rattachent6troitementau canton voisin de Zurich? Les
analogies sont beaucoup plus frappantesentre le code thurgovien et le code
Napoleon, qu'entre le meme code thurgovien et celui qu'a redig6 Bluntschli.
J'emprunte, Messieurs, au message du conseil federal du 24 novembre 1896
quelques autresconstatationsnon moins caract6ristiques:
'Le droitdes cantonsavantageles fils au ddtrimentdes filles dans les cantonsde
Lucerne, Fribourg, Zoug et Thurgovie. Schaffhouse et Neuchatel donnent aux
ascendantset collat6rauxle droit de retourselon l'origine des biens. Appenzell,
Argovie, Bale, Fribourg, Soleure ne font aucune distinction entre les lignes
paternelle et maternelle. Geneve, Thurgovie, le Jurabernois, Saint-Gall, Vaud,
Fribourg,Tessin et Soleure font des ascendantsune classe speciale d'heritiers.Les
substitutionsfiddicommissairessont interditesa Geneve, dans le Jurabernois, a
Lucerne, Glaris, dans les Grisons et a Zoug. Geneve le Jurabernois, Neuchatel,
Appenzell, Argovie, le Valais, Berne, Vaud, Glaris et Fribourg accordent a
l'enfant naturel une part dans la succession de son pere. Zurich, Geneve
Thurgovie, Soleure, Tessin, Neuchatel, St-Gall et le Jura bernois ont admis
l'adoption. Berne, Thurgovie, Argovie, Geneve, Soleure, Neuchatel, Fribourget
le Tessin donnenta ; le mere, au deces du pere la puissancepaternelleet la tutelle
des enfants. Gen6ve et Nidwald ont institu6 le conseil de famille, qui a pour
mission de surveiller la gestion du tuteur. Dans le domaine du droit des choses,
nous trouvonsle registre foncier a Bale-ville, Soleure, dans le canton de Vaud a
Schwytz et a Nidwald.' . . . J'abregema citation. Mais n'est-elle pas la meilleure
demonstrationde ce qu'il y a eu d'artificielet de fortuitdans la formationde notre
droitsuisse? Cette mosaique, qui semble le r6sultatde la fantaisieet du hasardpour
le moins autantque des influences 6thiquesou morales, ne doit pas nous remplir
d'une v6n6rationtelle que nous n'osions pas y toucher.
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might be treated as the basis of local custom. Or at the time of the
codification of cantonal law a new rule might be adopted without much
thoughtfrom an outside code, whetherof a differentcanton or of a foreign
state like Francewhich at the time had generalprestige. And, once accepted
for whateverreason, a rule lives on.)22
As the example of Englandalso makes abundantlyplain, legal development is greatly affected by the sources of law that are available. And here
I wantto pointout one aspectof developmentby juristicopinionthathas been
understressed,namely the ability and power of jurists to react against the
existingtraditionandin partcreatea new one. They are, of course, still bound
by what they know, butjurists can attemptto reject much of what has gone
before. Much more freely thanjudges, they can decide whom they wish to
regardas authoritativeand whom they will despise. They do not have to give
a rulingthat will be acceptablein a particularcase and, to be effective, they
need not cause a change in accepted dogma or methodology at once. They
can have long term aims. The prime example of jurists adopting a new
influentialapproachmustbe thatof the greatHumanistsof the Renaissance,
such as Cuiaciusand Donellus, with the rejectionof the methodologyof the
Glossators, Post-Glossatorsand, above all, of the Bartolists. To assess the
extent of their impact would require volumes but that need not detain us
here.23Whatneeds to be emphasizedis only thatjuristscan powerfullyaffect
the tradition.In this regard, naturally,the Humanistsdo not stand alone.
One otherexample of the power of juristsis significant.It comes from the
Kingdomof the Two Sicilies, and more particularlyfrom Naples, from the
late seventeenthwell into the eighteenthcentury.24There was a change in
attitudeamong the law professors, away from the traditionalauthoritiesto
other internationalfigures. Their works contain referencesto philosophers
such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieuand Descartes, as well as to
jurists such as Cuiacius, Donellus, Hotman, Brissonius, Bynkershoek,
Pufendorf, Stryk and Grotius.25 The Praelectiones ad Institutiones

22. For demonstrationof such developmentsin particularcases see e.g. Watson,Evolution,
supranote 1 at 28ff, 43ff (and especially at 58f).
23. But I have arguedelsewhere that the Humanists,by showing that to a great extent the
Corpus Juris Civilis was not of classical origin, weakened its authority and thus
academicscould more respectablypay attentionto otheraspects of local law. This was
an importantfactorin the codificationof civil law systems. See A. Watson,TheMaking
of the Civil Law (Cambridge,Mass., 1981) 71f. Thereare implicationsfor 'schools' of
jurists in D. Osler, 'A Star is Born', 2 RechtshistorischesJournal (1983) 194f.
24. See G. Manna,Della Giurisprudenzae del Foro Napoletanodella sua Originefino alla
Pubblicazionedelle nuove Leggi (Naples, 1859) 186f.
25. Examples of such book are F. Rapolla, De jure regni neapolitani Commentariain
ordine redacta (Naples, 1746); C. Fimiami, Elementajuris privati neapolitani in duos
libros redacta (Naples, 1782); M. Guarani,Syntagmaromanijuris ac patrii secundum
seriem InstitutionumImperialium(Naples, 1773); G. Maffei, Institutionesjuris civilis
Neapolitanorum (Naples, 1784); G. Basta, Institutionesjuris romani neapolitani
(Naples, 1782); 0. Fighera, Institutionesjuris regni neapolitani (Naples, 1782).
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Justiniani (1779) of M. Guarani may serve as one particular instance. The
book contains, among legal citations, references to local case law and
statute. Of references to foreign authors I made the following count: Noodt
30; Bynkershoek 22; Grotius 20; Stryk 19; J. Gothofredus 17; Vinnius 16;
Cujacius and Donellus 15 each; Heineccius 14; U. Huber 11; Pufendorf 10;
and fewer than 10 to many others. To Italian writers I find: Doctores 12 and
Glossa 3; Baldus 5; Bartolus 4; Irnerius, Accursius and Julius Clarus 1 each.
Astonishingly, given the Spanish connection, I find to Spanish jurists only
two references to Gomes and one to Covarruvias; and more surprisingly
still, none at all to the famous Neapolitan De Lucca. This rate of citation
seems very lopsided. This new approach was slow to have an impact but was
eventually powerfully felt as can be seen from the writings from the most
important writer on the practice of the time, the advocate Giuseppe Sorge.26
This Neapolitan phenomenon is quite typical of what happens when
jurists wish to change the existing tradition. To begin with, works which
previously were treated as authoritative are either not cited or are cited only
to be summarily dismissed; in either eventuality the opinions contained in
them are not properly considered. Then some other jurists are continually
cited, to an extent that to an outsider seems extreme-it still seems
astonishing that the Neapolitan Guarani cites the Dutchman Gerhardt Noodt
more often than anyone else (apart from himself), and that he cites ten
'foreigners' each more often than ten times and no Italian (other than
reporters of cases) more often than five times. Finally, it should be noted
that it takes time for their approach to have a practical impact.27
II
It is usually said that custom becomes law (in a system which has regard
for customary law) when people obey certain norms in the belief that they
are the law. I argued in the second chapter of The Evolution of Law that (in
such a system) so-called customary law is declared by judicial decision
(even where in general precedent has no binding force) and becomes law
thereby whether there was or was not an existing custom, whether if there
26. See Giuseppe Sorge, Jurisprudentiaforensis universijuris materias, 11 vols. (Naples,
1740-44); Giuseppe Sorge, Enucleationes casuum forensium, sive additamenta ad
opus jurisprudentiaeforensis, 11 vols. (Naples 1756-58).
27. An example closer to home, and equally typical of development by juristic interpretation, is provided by the group in the contemporaryU.S. known as Critical Legal
Studies scholars. They, too, attemptto reject much of what has gone before, though
they are bound by what they know. A glance at the footnotes in their writings will
quickly reveal whom they wish to regardas authoritative-references to RobertoUnger
and Duncan Kennedy are de rigueur-and whom they will despise. Indeed, some
writingsof the mastersare always, in all contexts, treatedas of the greatestrelevance.
A true believer reveals his faith by referringto these writings favorablyin the opening
pages of his own piece. For the group see the bibliographyof CriticalLegal Studies by
Alan Hunt in 47 Modern Law Review 369ff (1984).
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was one the judge followed it, and that frequently the rules of so-called
customary law are borrowed from elsewhere. Customarylaw derives its
validity from official recognition, I claimed, not from past popular
behavior.
In some instances the traditionalview is clearly wrong. 'Fueros' is the
name given in Spain to collections of local municipallaw, often containing
particular privileges. These are usually classed as short ('breves') or
extended('extensos'). The majorityof the formerdate fromthe eleventh and
twelfth centuries, the majorityof the lattera little later. It is a peculiarityof
the fueros that the most successful were, totally or partially, grantedto or
borrowedby othermunicipalities.The main outlinesof the transferof fueros
from town to town are well-known;in fact Ana MariaBarreroGarciain her
Fuero de Teruel publishes a map with arrows showing the direction, and
dates indicating the time, of movement of fueros from municipality to
municipality.28So long as fueros are regardedas containingcustomarylaw,
it is hardto see how their movementcan be regardedas consistent with the
traditionalnotion that customarylaw emerges from norms people obey in
the belief that they are law. Yet F. Tomas y Valiente, the most highly
regarded of the younger generation of Spanish legal historians, writes:
'Because they contain the customarylaw, alive in that place; because they
are in part the fruit of the municipal autonomy and at the same time its
guarantee,given that they contain the privileges on which this autonomyis
based and the rules for the choice by the locals of judges and town officials;
andbecause of the complete and self-sufficientnatureof the ordercontained
in them, the municipal fueros were considered by the towns and cities as
their own property and very important, and accordingly were defended
against other types of law (that of the king and that of the learnedjurists
because, as we shall see, bothbeganto develop in the 13thcentury).'29With
no apparentawareness that he is contradictinghis first clause, his next
sentencesrun:'Justas happenedwith shortfueros, the extendedfuero of one
town was often enough granteddirectlyto another.At times the redactorsof
the fuero of one city utilized as a model the alreadywrittentext of the law
of another.' The rest of his first passagejust quoted is more convincing for
the importanceattributedto fueros. Inhabitantsdefendedtheirfuero because
it granted them privileges; not because it contained the good old norms
derived from their habitualbehavior.
Nor was this movement of municipalcustomarylaw from town to town
confined to Spain. It occurred frequently elsewhere; in Normandy for
example. Thus, Eu borrowedthe privilegesof SaintQuentin,at Les Andelys
the rules were copied from those of Mantes, and in general the rules of
Normantowns derived from those of Rouen.30
28. Ana MariaBarreroGarcia, Fuero de Teruel (Madrid, 1979) 7.
29. F. Tomas y Valiente, Manualde Historia del derechoEspanol (Madrid,4th ed., 1983)
150.
30. See, e.g., R. Besnier, La Coutumede Normandie, histoire externe (Paris, 1935) 32
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There is anotherproblem with the traditionalview: the spatial limits of
customarylaw coincide with the political frontiers.RobertBesnier, writing
of the Coutume of Normandy, puts it this way: 'The political framework
becomes fixed at the momentwhen the necessity of a coutumeimposes itself
upon the Normans.Hence comes the parallelismbetween the creationof the
institutionsand the elaborationof the law. The limits of the dukedom and
the jurisdictionof the custom coincide: the latteris essentially fixed by the
repetition of identical acts in similar situations, it develops everywhere,
simultaneously,as well in the courts of justice as in daily relationsor in the
presence of officers charged with administrative, military or financial
matters.At a time when functionsare not yet clearly specializedthereare no
organisms which do not play their role in this slow elaboration.'31This
spatialcoincidence is more easily explained, as I arguedon other grounds,
if one says that where customarylaw is recognised it is created only when
it is officially recognised or accepted, and this recognition is signalled by
courtdecisions. Courtjurisdictionsand political boundariesthen necessarily
coincide.
I also arguedthat a difficulty for believing that customarylaw rested on
a general conviction that it was law was that often the custom was difficult
to find even when it could be said that there was something that could be
designated as the custom. A striking instance of the difficulty of knowing
the custom even when there was one is given by the Coutumede Toulouse.
This was writtendown in the 'livre blanc' which was kept in the town hall,
but it was written in Latin! Cazaveteripublished an edition in 1545 with
short notes but still in Latin. Frangois-Frangoisin 1615 published selected
titles with commentary,this time in French,but the work containedless than
half of the Coutume.In the eighteenthcenturyvery few copies of these (long
out-of-print)books were to be found in lawyers' offices or at booksellers.
Only at the very end of the 18th centurywas the whole Coutumetranslated
into Frenchand publishedby Soulatges with the express intentionof making
it accessible to lawyers and others.32
Toulouse was by no means the only place whose custom was written in
Latin; the same occurred elsewhere, for instance in Spain. Thus, the
customs of Leridawhich were the first redactionof local laws in Catalonia
were writtenin Latin in 1228 by GuillermoBotet. Subsequentlythey were
turned into Catalanbut significantly that version has not survived though
there are five manuscriptsof the Latin.33And if one accepts, as I think one
[hereinaftercited as Coutume]. If, as often the privileges of one town were grantedto
anotherby the rulerthen the result is statute, not customarylaw. Nonetheless, as with
the redactionof coutumes in Francein general, the writtenredactionwas regardedin
fact as containing customarylaw.
31. Ibid. at 22.
32. Soulatges, La Coutumede Toulouse(Toulouse)ix. The work is not dated, but the latest
reference is to 10 November, 1769.
33. See P. Loscertalesde Valdeavellano, Costumbresde Lerida (Barcelona, 1946) lOff.
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should, thatfueros ought to be regardedin partas containingcustomarylaw
then one should include as customs writtenin Latinthose of, for instancein
Extremadura,Calatayud(1131), Daroca (1142), Teruel (1177) and Cuenca
(1188 or slightly thereafter).
Of course, often in a customarysystem law is needed where there is no
law or, if thereis, it cannotbe found. The law has to be created.To give one
furtherexample: King Liutprandof the Lombardsin several years of his
reign issued a numberof laws. In some of the preambleshe expressly states
that the laws that follow are enacted precisely because the custom is not
known or, if it is, is not wanted by persons other than him. Thus, for his
thirteenthyear (725 A.D.): 'Because I rememberedthat subjects of ours
coming into our presence broughtcauses in controversyamong themselves
which we were not certainhow to bring to an end accordingto custom nor
were providedfor in the body of the Edict.'34The Lombardswere fortunate
that theirs was a society with statutorylaw as well as custom; otherwise a
custom would just have been imagined to exist.
Also, as I maintained, the whole notion of customary law being what
people do is underminedby the usual approachin medieval and laterFrance
of acceptingthe law of somewhereelse, usually of Rome as the law was set
out in the CorpusJuris Civilis or of Paris as the law was to be found in the
Coutumede Paris, as subsidiarylaw when the local coutume failed to give
the answer. Whichever was chosen, conditions in early Byzantium or the
capitalof Francewere very differentfrom those, say, in partsof Brittanyor
the Auvergne. And there is no doubt that gaps often had to be filled in the
local coutume. But what is the standarddoctrineof customarylaw to make
of the fact thatjust before the FrenchRevolution (which was to put an end
to local custom) it could still be questionedin generalwhetherrecoursewas
to be had to the CorpusJuris Civilis or the Coutumede Paris?35In circumstances such as these one cannoteven say that in the absence of a custom it
was the custom to look at the custom or other law of some other particular
place!
Apartfrom any otherconsiderations,thereis one reasonthatI should like
to mention that will make it very difficult for my thesis on the natureof
customarylaw to become acceptable.The reasonis very practical.No society
that accepts a system of customarylaw can operateit on the open basis that
I postulate. The law would lack authority.Such societies operatein law by
a myth. In generalthey have no legislation, do not acceptjudicial decisions
as binding precedent, either have no law books or do not see them as
authoritative.How then do they resolve disputes?The legitimateanswerfor
those living undersuch systems can only be that they look for the normsof

34. 'Dummemorassemquod venienteshominesnostri, in praesentiamnostram,adduxerint
caussas, inter se altercantes quae nec per usumfuimus certi ad terminandum,nec in
Edicti corpore anteriori incerto.' See also for slightly different issues the preambles
from his fourteenth(726 A.D.) and fifteenth (727 A.D.) years.
35. See., e.g., Soulatges, La Coutumede Toulouse, supranote 32 at xiff.
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practicalbehavior that are generally regardedby the populace as binding.
Therecannotbe open recognitionthattheremay not be a custom, that a rule
may be accepted as law simply because it exists elsewhere, or that a judge
is just makingup a rule. But a mythto live by is to the outsiderno less a myth.
To illustratethe precedingparagraphwe can turnagain to the Costumbres
de Lerida. Botet lists at the beginning of the work the sources of law in
Lerida and he includes mores, customary behavior. But he says he was
urgedby his fellow consuls and othercitizens to write down the custom and
he explains in the opening paragraphwhy he did so: 'I GuillermoBotet have
put in some little effort in orderto collect in one place and set out in writing
the various and different customs of our city in order to take away the
opportunityof evil-doing from some people who declare, when a custom is
in their favor, that it is the custom. If it is alleged against them in a similar
case they insist that it is not the custom. Hence, proof of customs delays the
progressof law suits and thus litigantsincursevere costs.'36If the difficulty
of finding and knowing the custom can plausibly be given by Botet as his
reasonfor writingdown the customs then in fact he incidentallygives the lie
to the notion that customary law arises from normative behavior which
occurs because people believe it is the law. Yet, as we have seen, Botet
himself says that in this connection it is the mores which are law. He also
tells us in paragraphs168 and 169 that among the sources of law ranking
aftercustoms are inter alia Visigothic law then Roman law. Visigothic law
is seldom followed, he says, but Roman law often is especially in matters
which do not arise every day. In effect he is saying that in the absence of
custom, custom assumes thatRoman law will be assumedto be the custom.
There is no other basis for accepting that Roman law is authoritative.
Equally significantly, the fuero of Cuenca-as do many other collections
of customs-gives as the justification for their redaction into writing:
'Because thereforehuman memory is transient.' Again, if customs cannot
be rememberedthey cannotbe obeyed because of a consciousness that they
are law.37Even if the transienceof memoryis not a reasonfor the redaction
of custom it is significant that it is given.

36. 'Ego GuillelmusBotetus dedi aliquantulamoperamut consuetudinesciuitatis uarias et
diuersas in unum colligerem et scriptis comprehenderemut aufferreturquibusdam
occasio malignandi qui quando erat pro eis consuetudo et esse consuetudinem
affirmabant. Si contra eos in consimili casu allegabatur non esse consuetudinem
asserebant. Undeprocessus causarumprobacio consuetudinisretardabatet litigantes
inde dispendia grauia senciebant.'
37. 'Quoniamigitur humana labilis est memoria nec rerum turbepotest sufficere ob hoc
cautele sagaci actum est arbitrio leges autentice institutionis et iura civica, que
consulta discretione ad sedendam seditionem inter cives [et incolas] de regali
auctoritate manarunt, litterarum apicibus anotari, ut majori, quia regali tuicione
munitas, malignantiumversucia nullatenuspossint infringi, vel alicuius subreptioris
molestia deinceps eneruari;' to be found in R. de Urefia, Fuero de Cuenca (Madrid,
1935) 111. Of course, since the compilation is official it has become statute and the
fuero does contain legislative materialsbut that does not affect the issue.
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III
In the third chapter of The Evolution of Law I sought to explain what
happens when legal systems of very different levels of sophistication come
into powerful contact. Above all I wanted to show that the Reception of
Roman law in Western Europe, far from being one of the most difficult
problems of history, corresponds to cultural patterns of development. A
mature legal system in writing can easily be used as a quarry even by
societies with very different economic and social structures. Each society
takes what it wants, when it wants, and there is no great desire to search for
the most appropriate rule. Who in particular does the taking and who in
particular does not want to search too far is obvious: the law making elite.
The developed system in writing is above all accessible, with rules that can
be used to fill gaps in the other systems. Such a Reception presents difficult
problems only for those-and they are many-who believe that there is a
very close correlation between the law of a society and the life of the
society.
I did not go beyond explaining the Reception of Roman law. That great
example illumines others. But it is worth examining one modern phenomenon to show that it, too, corresponds in great measure to the pattern. The
phenomenon I mention is the taking over in whole or in large part of a
modern western code by a 'third world country' with the specific aim of
modernization.
The example I wish to discuss is Turkey which in 1926 took into its civil
code virtually all of the two Swiss codes, the Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch
and the Obligationenrecht. Turkey in the same year promulgated its
commercial code which was a compilation of at least a dozen foreign
statutes, and issued in 1929 its code of the sea which is a translation of book
four of the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch).
The Turkish Minister of Justice of the time, Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, on the
occasion of the Festschrift of the Istanbul Law Faculty to mark the civil
code's fifteenth birthday, explained the reasons for the codification. The
first was that the Turkish legal system was backward and primitive. Three
kinds of religious law were in force, Islamic, Christian and Jewish, each
with its appropriate court. Only a kind of law of obligations, the 'Mecelle',
and real property law was common to all. The second was that the
recognition of such an odd system of justice, namely that three kinds of law
applied through three kinds of courts, could not correspond to the modern
understanding of the state and its unity. The third and most important was
that each time Turkey had demanded the removal of the capitulation terms
of the First World War by the victorious Allies, the latter refused, pointing
to the backward state of the Turkish legal system and its connection with
religion. When as a result of the Lausanne Peace Treaty the capitulation
terms were removed, the Turks took it upon themselves to form a completely
new Turkish organization of justice with a new legal system, new laws and
new courts. Bozkurt said that in one word the system was to be 'Worldly'.
The duties undertaken by the Turks under the Lausanne Treaty had to be
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accomplishedas quickly as possible. During the First World War commissions were already set up in Istanbulto preparelaws and they had started
work. The results were examined in 1924. After seven or eight years there
were only completed 200 articles on a law of obligations, the sections on
succession, guardianship,formationof marriageand divorce of a civil code,
of a criminalcode between seventy and eighty articles, and even the code of
land transactionswas only a torso.38Consequently after various systems
were looked at, the two Swiss codes were virtuallyadoptedin theirentirety.
Thoughthe motivationwas differentfrommost earlierreceptions-drastic
modernizationof society rather than the filling of gaps in the law-the
Turkishreceptionwas otherwisesimilar.The creationof new autochthonous
law is difficult, it is much easier to borrowfrom an alreadyexisting, more
sophisticatedsystem which can be used as a model, above all wherethe donor
system is accessible in writing. By this time, of course, there were various
excellent codes which could have provided a model, notably the French,
Germanand Swiss all of which were greatly admired.Why was Swiss law
chosen? Various answers have been given but three strike me as most
important;the Swiss laws were the most modern;39Switzerlandhad been
neutralduringthe WarwhereasFrenchlaw was that of a formerenemy and
German law was that of a defeated ally; and Bozkurt had studied law in
Switzerland, so Swiss law was most familiar to him. Hirsch, a German
scholar who was a professor of commercial law at Istanbul and Ankara
between 1933 and 1952 emphasizesthe-to him, overriding-importance of
the last factor.40In any event, thereis no reasonto thinkthatsomehow Swiss
law was more adaptedthan were Frenchor Germanlaw to the society that
Turkeywanted to become.
Hirsch stresses the nature of such a reception. What is imported, he
insists, is neitherforeign law nor foreign codes, but foreignculturalproperty
which only after its linguistic and systematic transformationfinds the
appropriateexternal form, and only in the act of legislation is it fixed as a
binding legal rule and comes into force.41 Even after such legislation a
reception is not a once and for all act, but a social process extending over
many years. The resultwill not be Swiss law in Turkey,but Turkishlaw that
owes much to Swiss legal culture, concepts and rules.
To continue with Turkey as an example. Some Swiss rules will not be
acceptedat all and others will be changed. For instance, the legal regime in
Switzerland for spouses' property is community property (ZGB 178), in
38. Bozkurtis quoted (in German)in E. E. Hirsch, Rezeptionals sozialer Prozess (Berlin,
1981) 33f [hereinaftercited as Hirsch, Rezeption].
39. See e.g. H. V. Velideoglu, 'Erfahrungenmit dem Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch
in der Turkei', Zeitschriftfur Schweizerisches Recht [hereinaftercited as ZSR] 81
(1962) 51ff at 53 .
40. Hirsch, 'Die Einflusse und WirkungenauslandischenRechts auf das heutige Tiirkische
Recht', Zeitschriftfur das gesamte Handelsrecht 116 (1954) 201ff at 206.
41. Hirsch, Rezeption, supranote 38 at llf.
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Turkey it is separate property (Turkish Civil Code 170); the surviving
spouse's right to a usufruct is smaller in Turkey (TCC 444 ?2) than in
Switzerland (ZGB 462 ?2); the judicial separation of spouses may in
Switzerlandbe pronouncedfor an indefinite time (ZGB 147 ?1) but not
in Turkey(TCC 139 ? 1); desertionas a groundof divorce must in the former
countryhave lasted at least two years (ZGB 140), in the latterat least three
months(TCC 132); the minimumage for marriagein the formeris for males
twenty, for females eighteen (exceptionallyeighteen and seventeen,) in the
latter for males eighteen, for females seventeen. Other rules will be
accidentallymistranslatedand the final result need not be that of the donor
nation. Otherswill be deliberatelygiven a differentvalue in the translation.
Still others will remain a dead letter because they have no counterpartin
Turkishconditions. The Turkishcourts in giving flesh to the rules through
interpretationmay, as they usually but not always have done, follow the
interpretationof the Swiss courts. Again, many rules will have a different
societal value in the two countries, such as those on a minimum age for
marriageor on the requirementsfor a divorce.42Finally such a reception, as
fast as Atatiirkwanted it to be, will, like that of Roman law and of other
systems, be a slow process, and the speed and the extent of its successnever complete-will vary with circumstances.
A little more must be said on this last point. To begin with, any new law
resulting from such a massive transplantationhas to be learned by judges
and lawyers as well as by the people before it becomes effective. In the case
of Turkey,where the new legal system was so differentfrom what had gone
before but was so closely attachedto Europeanmodels, the solution was to
importforeign professorsfrom Germanyand Switzerland,notably Andreas
B. Schwartzand ErnstE. Hirsch, to teach the new law and to send budding
lawyers and law professorsto study law in Europe.43Secondly, aspects of
traditionalsocial life, such as marriage, will respond only slowly to the
pressuresof new law especially in countrydistricts. Significantly, essays in
a collection44published to mark the thirtieth anniversaryof the Turkish
codificationstress the extent to which the receptionhad not 'taken' whereas
those in another collection to mark the fiftieth anniversary accept the
reception but emphasize its continuing natureand the fact that is not, nor
will be, complete.45In 1956, KurtLipsteincould describethe consequences
of compulsorycivil marriageas 'disappointing,to say the least'.46 In 1978,
June Starrreportedthat, in a particularvillage which she had studied, she

42. See e.g. Hirsch, Rezeption, supranote 38; M. Zwahlen, 'L'Applicationen Turquiedu
Code civil recu de la Suisse', ZSR 95 (1976), 249ff.
43. See Hirsch, Rezeption, supranote 38 at 56f.
44. Annales de la Faculte de Droit d'Istanbul 5 (1956) [hereinaftercited as AFDI].
45. Fiinfzig Jahre TiirkischesZivilgesetzbuch,ZSR 95 (1976), 217ff.
46. KurtLipstein, 'The Receptionof WesternLaw in Turkey', AFDI, supranote 44 at 6,
3ffat 18.
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found little evidence 'that villagers are lax in obtaining state marriage
licenses' .47

The success or partial, yet still growing, success of the transplantingof
Swiss legal ideas into Turkeygives many insights into what happens when
a less 'modern'or less 'developed' system comes into powerfulcontactwith
a sophisticated modern system. These insights become almost blinding
when we recall thatEugen Huberwho virtuallyalone was responsiblefor the
ZGB said that 'The law must be deliveredin speech out of the thoughtof the
people. The reasonableman who reads it, who has ponderedthe age and its
needs, must have the perceptionthatthe law was deliveredto him in speech
from the heart.' ('Das Gesetz muss aus den Gedankendes Volkes heraus
gesprochen sein. Der verstandigeMann, der es liest, muss die Empfindung
haben, das Gesetz sei ihm vom Herzen gesprochen.')48 And Virgile Rossel,
declared 'In particularif one could say of the code Napoleon that it was
'writtenreason' we intendedto work accordingto the sense of the national
spirit, raisingthe moral level of our law so far as possible, and we would be
happyif it was said one day of the Swiss civil code thatit is, to some extent,
the written internalmoral sentiment.' ('En particulier si l'on a pu dire du
code Napoleon qu'il etait la 'raison ecrite' nous avons cru travailler dans
le sens de I'esprit national en moralisant notre droit autant que faire se
pouvait, et nous serions heureux si l'on disait un jour du code civil suisse
qu'il est un peu la conscience ecrite.' )49 Yet the same Virgile Rossel, as we
saw in the first section, was well awarethatthe differencesin the laws of the
various Swiss Cantons could not be explained on the basis of religion,
economy, language or 'race'.
Thus, the Swiss codification was intendedby those who worked on it to
be the writtenmoral consciousness of the Swiss people. The arbitraryrules
of cantonal law were to be remedied by federal law appropriateto the
conditionsof the Swiss. The 'Swissness' of the codificationis stressed. Yet
the Swiss codificationcould be takenover, almost in its entirety, some years
later by Turkey, a country with a vastly different history, legal tradition,
religion, culture, economy, political setup, geographical and climatic
circumstances.Turkeyunder Ataturkis a prime example not only of legal
transplantbut of revolution in law.50
To the picturein chapterthree I have nothing more directly to add, but it
is frequently suggested to me that if the Reception was so naturalthen I
47. June Starr,Dispute and Settlementin Rural Turkey(Leiden, 1978) 276.
48. Eugen Huber, Erlauterungenzum Vorentwurfdes Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes (Bern, 2nd ed., 1914) 2.
49. Virgile Rossel, Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung,Nationalrat (1905) 438.
50. See Watson, Evolution, supra note 1 at 116. For an illuminatingexample of largely
inappropriaterules being borrowed 'Just because they were there' see S.B. Burbank,
'ProceduralRulemakingunderthe JudicialCouncils Reform and JudicialConductand
Disability Act of 1980', 131 Universityof PennsylvaniaLaw Review 283ff (1982).
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ought to explain why it did not also occur in England. Whatfollows then is
a preliminaryattemptat that explanation.
A first point that should be stressedis that within the areas most affected
by the Reception there were particularreasons for accepting easily the
authorityof Roman law. For the Italianstates there was no problemin their
seeing themselves as the direct descendantsand heirs of the Roman legal
tradition.Moreover,even duringthe periodof personalratherthanterritorial
law Roman law remainedpowerful: the Catholic Churchin particularwas
governed by it. It had also had a powerful influence on Lombardlaw, both
on the codifications and on its subsequentdevelopment, and the Lombard
lawyers at the Universityof Pavia used Romanlaw as a universalsubsidiary
system to fill gaps.51In France, the Reception was powerful in the South,
thepays de droit ecrit, from a line on the coast just west of the Ile d'Oleron,
proceeding roughly eastwards along a line just north of Saintonge,
Languedoc,Lyonnais, MaconnaisandBresse. ApartfromPoitou, Berryand
Haute-Bourgognewhich were territoriesof customary law, this territory
was, in earliertimes when personallaw flourished, precisely the land of the
Burgundiansand the Visigoths who issued for their Gallo-Romansubjects
the lex RomanaBurgundionumand, more particularly,the highly prizedand
influential Breviarium Alaricianum.52In these circumstances it is not
surprisingthat Roman law was treatedas the law of the land, but as law by
custom; and in force only in so far as it was not replacedby a subsequent,
dissonant custom. As for the Holy Roman Empire of the GermanNation,
that was regardedas a continuationof the Roman Empirefrom as early as
the twelfth century; indeed the notion that the German empire was a
continuation of the Roman Empire appears as early as the Carolingian
period.53In fact, some legislation of the EmperorsFrederickI and II was
interpolatedinto the CorpusJuris, and some doctrinesof Roman law were
seen as favoringthe Emperor.In 1165 FrederickI spoke of 'the example of
our divine Emperorswho are our predecessors'. [MGHConst I, n. 227, 322
c.3]54In a constitutionin the LibriFeudorum,2.27, he describeshimself as
'Romanus Imperator'; and in another constitution recorded in the same
work, 2.52, dated 7 November, 1136, Lothar calls himself the third
'ImperatorRomanorum'.
Present-dayNetherlandsand Switzerlandalso experiencedthe Reception.
But precisely at the most significanttime, thatof the translatioimperii, they
formed part of the Holy Roman Empire.
51. See e.g., Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (F. M.
Powicke and A. B. Emden, ed., (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1936) 105. F. Calasso, Medio Evo
del Diritto 1 (Milan, 1954), 161ff, 215ff, 235ff, 267ff, 305ff.
52. See above all, E. Chdnon, Histoire Generale du Droit francais Public et Prive des
Origines a 1815 1 (Paris, 1926) 488.
53. See e.g. H. Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte(Karlsruhe,2nd ed., 1962) ii: 233f
[hereinaftercited as Conrad,Rechtsgeschichte].
54. Ibid. at i: 234.
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Secondly, it is easily overlookedthatfor a very long time Englandwas by
no means an exceptional case. The Reception even where the soil was
fertile, was, as we shall see in the case of Germanyand France, not fast.
Thus, despite the 'theoreticalReception' in Germany (the notion that the
Holy Roman Empire was a continuation of the Roman Empire), the
'practicalReception' (the actual acceptanceof Roman legal rules as living
law) came much later. No sharpdistinctioncan really be drawnbetween the
'theoretical'and the 'practicalReception' but, for the latter, 1495 is usually
regardedas a significantdate when the Reichskammergerichtwas createdas
the supremecourt of the Holy Roman Empireand when it was enacted that
half of the judges of it should be doctores iuris, that is, judges trained in
Roman law. Despite the enormousboost given to the Reception of Roman
law in Germany by the theory of the continuation of empire, the real
Reception in the sense of actual acceptancein practiceis to be dated to the
fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies.55It was then that the CorpusJuris Civilis
so far as glossed -'Quidquid non agnoscit glossa, non agnoscit curia'was acceptedas a whole as law, thoughindeed only as subsidiarylaw which
was displaced by local statuteor custom.
The so-called 'Lotharian Legend', that the Emperor Lothar of Supplinburghad expressly received Roman law as statutein 1135, which was
apparentlythe invention of Phillip Melancthon, was refuted by Hermann
Conring in his De origine juris Germaniciof 1643. Thereafter,both Italy
and Germanyhad need of new theoreticalanswers to the question why the
CorpusJuris Civilis was given authority.Into these we need not go.56 The
Reception had alreadybasically occurred.
In France, in the pays de droit coutumier, the progressof the Reception
was even slower. The variouslocal coutumeswere eventuallyto be reduced
to writing (and converted into statute law) as a result of Charles VII's
Ordonnancede Montil-les-Tourswhich was dated April 1453. The slow
redactionof the coutumes was virtuallycomplete by the middle of the 16th
century.57These written coutumes were influenced to various degrees by
Roman law but in none did it appearas the predominantelement. Much for
the future was to depend on the outcome of a doctrinalbattle which was
mentionedin the preceding section. Some authorities,notably PierreLizet
(1482-1554), First Presidentof the Parlementof Paris, wanted Roman law
to be the common law of France as lex scripta58 but this was opposed

55. Conrad,Rechtsgeschichte, ii: 339ff.
56. But see above all K. Luig, 'Der Geltungsgrund des romischen Rechts in 18.
Jahrhundertin Italien, Frankreichund Deutschland' in La Formazione storica del
Diritto moderno in Europa 2 (1977) 819ff [hereinaftercited as Luig, 'Geltungsgrund'].
57. Formoredetailandreferencessee, e.g., A. Watson,Sourcesof Law, Legal Change, and
Ambiguity(Philadelphia, 1984) 47ff [hereinaftercited as Watson, Sources of Law].
58. In fact he insertedmuch Romanlaw into the customs he drew up, such as thatof Berry;
see R. Filhol, Le premierpresident Christofle de Thou (Paris, 1937) especially at 67.
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vigorously by others such as Christophede Thou, (1508-1582) also First
Presidentof the Parlementof Paris, Guy Coquille (1523-1603), Etienne
Pasquier(1529-1615), and later by Nicholas Catherinot(1628-1688) who
wantedRomanlaw treatedonly as ratio scripta. The distinctionwas crucial.
If Roman law was only ratio scripta then, in the absence of a rule in the
coutume, it would have authorityfor a judge only if it were in harmonywith
the principlesof the coutume, only if it appearedjust (andthen for the judge
its authoritywas precisely because it was just); and the judge could prefer
the authorityof another coutume such as the Coutume de Paris. But if
Roman law were lex scripta and was thus the law in force in the absence of
a contrarycustom, then the judge would have to apply it. In the event, in
accordancewith the spirit of the Ordonnanceof Phillipe-le-Bel of 1312,
Roman law was treatedonly as ratio scripta in most of the pays de droit
coutumier.59The main exceptions, where the coutumes expressly adopted
Roman law in the absence of a relevant provision, were the Coutumes of
Berry, Haute-Marche,Auvergne and Bourbonnaiswhich were adjacentto
the pays de droit ecrit, the Coutumesof Burgundy,Franche-Comteand les
Trois-Evecheswhich were close to the territoryof the Holy RomanEmpire,
and some of the coutumes in Flanders.60This apparent influence of
geographyis very revealing.
The debate on the natureof the authorityof Roman law may be seen as
partof, or relatedto, a largerissue, namely the unificationof the coutumes.
This was above all the great desire of Charles Dumoulin or Molinaeus
(1500-1566), who was to have a preponderantinfluence in future development, though not perhapsin a way that he envisaged. The Coutumede
Paris of 1510 was very short and incomplete. In 1539 Dumoulinpublished
his treatise on fiefs, which was the beginning of a commentaryon this
Coutume. Here he expressed his criticisms and proposed new approaches,
most of which were adoptedby the Parlementof Paris. Consequentlythere
was disaccord between the Coutume and the case law which led to the
promulgationin 1580 of a much larger and improved Coutume de Paris
underthe guidanceof Christophede Thou. The Parlementof Parisoperated
in effect as a courtof appealfor many othertowns; its 'ressort'covered the
jurisdictionof fifty municipal and local coutumes. Etienne Pasquier, who
had participatedin the preparationof the new Coutumede Paris held that in
these fifty jurisdictionsthe Coutumede Paris shouldbe known and followed
'because', as he put it, 'Paris was in this kingdom what Rome was in the
Empire'. This called forththe wrathof Guy Coquillewho believed thatother
coutumesshould be used equally with the Coutumesde Paristo supplement
the local law.61
In fact the Coutume de Paris was to prove very acceptable in other
59. For the doctrinaldebate see above all V. Guizzi, 'I1dirittocomune in Francianel xvii
secolo', T.v.R. 37 (1969), Iff; Luig, 'Geltungsgrund',supranote 56 at 832ff.
60. See above all, E. Ch6non, Histoire generale 2 (1929) 331f.
61. See above all, ibid. at 317ff; Watson, Sources of Law, supranote 57 at 70f.
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jurisdictions. A significant step in that direction occurred in 1747 when
FrancaisBourjonpublishedLe Droit Communde la France et la Coutume
de Paris. The opening paragraphof this work seems obscure until one
realizes that he is treatingthe common law of France and the Coutumede
Paris as the same thing. This in itself is indicative of the success of the
Coutumebut in its turn Bourjon's large and clear text spreadthe message
that the Coutumede Paris was the law of France.
But one must not exaggerate the extent to which there had not been a
Reception of Roman law in France, on the eve of the Revolution. First, of
course, there was a full Reception in the pays de droit ecrit. Secondly, this
Reception had a continued effect on the pays de droit coutumier because
throughit Romanrules and solutions were known since books on the law of
Franceset out the law in the pays de droit ecrit as well as the provisions of
the various coutumes. Thirdly, even when a jurisdiction looked to the
Coutumede Paris or some other coutume to fill gaps, when a solution was
not found in that way recourse was still had to Roman law. And even the
reformed Coutume de Paris had many gaps, with only 372 articles.
Fourthly, Frenchjurists, even those most addicted to their coutumes had
deep knowledge of and great respect for Roman law. Roman law is
prominentin their works. The influentialRobertPothier(1699-1722) may
serve as an example. Fourthly, many books, including that of Bourjon,
show the influence of Justinian's Institutes on their structure. This is
especially true of institutionalwritings62such as GabrielArgou's Institution
du droitfranfais which was first publishedin 1692 and reachedits eleventh
edition in 1787. The structureof the French code civil is similar to that of
the works of Bourjon and Argou. Thus, the Reception, even in favored
locales such as Germanyand France, was slow.
A thirdpoint that is frequentlydownplayedis that much Roman law was
actually borrowedby English law. Around 1600 Thomas Craig, in his Jus
Feudale, at 1.7.22,3 puts it this way: 'The Civil Law is rarely used in
England, and although among the English are found very learned men in
every branchof learning, still there are few who devote themselves to the
Civil Law, they are contentwith a bowing acquaintancewith it, since native
institutionsand customs are more in use with them: hence the learned say
thatthe English use municipallaw when the Scots are governedby the Civil
Law. But so little are they free from the Civil Law in theirjudgments, that
reasons and decisions of it, as if living sparks, are found in all mattersand
controversieswhich they, however, preferto ascribe to their own men than
to owe to the ancientjurists. In the event a great dependenceon the Civil
Law shines forthin all controversiesto such an extent thatan expertin Civil
Law understandsthat the greatest controversies of English law can be
62. For this notion see K. Luig, 'The Institutesof National Law in the seventeenth and
eighteenth Centuries,' Juridical Review (1972), 193ff; J. Cairns, 'Institutional
Writings in Scotland Reconsidered', Journal of Legal History 4 (1983) 76ff. For
France and the code civil see now above all C. Chene, L'Enseignementdu Droit
francais en pays de droit ecrit (1679-1793) (Geneva, 1982) especially at 323ff.
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decided according to the sources of the Civil Law and the replies of the
jurisconsultsor Emperors,as often appearsfrom the reportsof Plowden and
Dyer.' As elsewhere, Craig exaggerates:his motivationis to indicate that
the differences between Scots law and English law are not so great as are
often supposed. And yet, without some considerableadmixtureof Roman
law into England, his claim would have appeared simply ridiculous.
Accuracy, in the state of the evidence, is difficult to attain, but what can
surely be stated is that the influence of Roman law in Englandvaried from
time to time and from type of courtjurisdictionto jurisdiction.
In this instance it is perhaps sensible not to begin at the beginning.
Writingof formularies,of collections of writs, Milsom claims:
In one respect the most illuminatingof these formularieswas that which acquiredthe
title Brevia Placitata. Dating from soon after the middle of the thirteenthcentury, it is
a conflatedformularygiving both writsand counts. But the writs, which in real life were
always in Latin, areheretranslatedinto French,the languagein which counts, at any rate
in the king's courts, were actually spoken, the ordinarylanguage of the upperclasses.
This collection was for the use, or more probablythe instruction,of professionalmen,
literatemen, but men not at home in the Latintongue and not interestedin the riches to
which it gave access. The common law had startedits careeras an alternativelearning,
cut off fromeven the legal learningof the universitieswhich untilthe eighteenthcentury
taughtonly Roman and canon law.
Almost at the same time as the counters' modest Brevia Placitata Bractongave final
shape to a much largerand more ambitiousbook; and it is one of the importantfacts in
the history of western thoughtthat the formerwas to prove fruitful, the lattersterile.63

By the last sentence of his first paragraph,Milsom means, I think, not that
the originsof the common law lay in an alternativelearning,cut off from the
universities, but that it was at this time aroundthe middle of the thirteenth
centurythatthe common law cut itself off from the universitiesand became
an alternative learning. If this interpretationis correct then Milsom's
position, I suppose, would be that in England, as elsewhere in Europe in,
say, the eleventh century, the local law was more or less free from Roman
influence but thatinfluence beganto be felt in Englandas elsewhere, though
not necessarilyso early or so powerfully,until it was disruptedin the age of,
or succeeding, Bracton.
Thus, the law book written apparentlyshortly before 1118 which is
known as Leges Henrici Primi64cites for instanceSalic and Ripuarianlaws
and Frankishcapitularies;hence it is significantas JohnBarton, the leading
expert on Roman law in medieval England, observes that there are so few
traces of Roman law.65 No attempt was being made by the author to
Romanise. Another private work of the time, the Leis Willelme, contains
some Roman law, but of this Barton endorses Maitland's judgment: 'It
63. Foundations, supranote 2 at 40f.
64. F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland,History of EnglishLaw 1 (Cambridge,reissued 1968),
99f [hereinaftercited as History].
65. John Barton, Roman Law in England (Milan, 1971) 7 [hereinaftercited as Barton,
RomanLaw].
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shows us how men were helplessly looking about for some general
principles of Jurisprudencewhich would deliver them from their practical
and intellectualdifficulties.'66
The treatisewrittenin the 1180s and which goes underGlanvill's name is
a very practicalwork based on what was happeningin the royal courts. 'The
author is writing of matters which are in regular use and within his own
experience. If there are cases which the King's court is not preparedto deal
with, he says so. He is under no temptationto fill the gaps with matter
borrowedfrom Salian or RipuarianFranksor, for the matterof that, from
Roman law. By the same token, when he does borrow from the civil law,
this is a very much more significant circumstancethan the use of a few
maxims by the author of the Leis Willelme.'67 Some use is made of Roman

terminology though not always with the Roman meaning,68and book ten
which treats of the English equivalents of Roman contracts shows some
acquaintancewith Romanlaw. But despite the use of the Romancontractual
terms the substantivelaw looks very different:'The most strikingfeatureof
this book of the treatise is the conflict, if this be not too strong a term,
between the form and the substance.'69
Henry of Bractonwas a royal judge who died in 1268. The treatise, De
Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAnglie, which goes underhis name shows very
considerable knowledge both of Roman law directly and of the learned
continentaljurists, notably Azo.70 The arrangementof the work also owes
much to the structure of Justinian's Institutes. What is not so easily
determinedis the extent to which Roman law had influenced the substance
of English law. As Bartonputs it, at times BractonRomanises but at other
times he is clearly anglicizing. How far Bracton accurately depicts the
common law and the extent to which English rules in resembling Roman
rules betraytheirorigin are questionstoo difficult to be resolved here. What
concerns us more is the likelihood that, because of the Romanised
appearanceof the De Legibus, if Bracton'streatisehad been influential and
if he had been followed on the Bench by others trainedas he was, England
would have undergonea Reception. But as Milsom noted, it was the Brevia
Placitata that was to prevail.
Yet, to contrastEnglandwith continentalstates of the period, one should
not ignore the success of the unromanised works such as the Brevia
Placitata. After all, not so long before-certainly before 1235, probably
between 1221 and 1224-had been written the enormously successful

66. History, supra note 64 at 1, 102; quoted by Barton, Roman Law, supranote 65 at 8.
67. Ibid. at 9.
68. See G. D. G. Hall, ed., The Treatiseon the Laws and Customsof the Realmof England
commonlycalled Glanvill (London, 1965) xxxvi.
69. Barton, Roman Law, supranote 65 at 11.
70. See above all, ibid. at 13ff.
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Sachsenspiegel.71Originallyin Latinit was rapidlyturnedinto low German,
probably East Saxon, by its author, Eike van Repgow. It was in turn
translatedinto otherGermandialects, Dutch and back into Latin. Of its two
parts,over 200 manuscriptssurvive of the 'Landrecht'and nearly 150 of the
'Lehnrecht'. Its influence was great well beyond the confines of the area
whose customarylaw it described.And, in Francetoo, even much laterthan
Bracton, books such as the Tres Ancienne Coutumede Bretagne of 1315
were to prove influential. The clue to the different development that is
takingplace and will continuelies not in the use made of Romanlaw in these
works. In England,Franceand Germanyalike, therewere books very much
influenced by Roman law and books which were very much less so. Both
existed side-by-side. But whereas books such as the Sachsenspiegel and
French works on customary law set out the substantivelaw, the English
works such as the Brevia Placitata,72 Novae Narrationes,73 Placita
Coronae,74and the Court Baron75are formularies setting out writs and
pleadings. The successful English works are gearedvery narrowlyto aiding
the practisinglawyer to bringthe suit in the properformalmanner.This was
to be the direction for English law in the succeeding centuries. And here
Roman law had no role to play.
Bracton may be regarded as the high-water mark of the influence of
Roman law in medieval England. The attitudeto Roman law in medieval
England, as in Scotland and continental Europe, corresponded to that
described by the present writer in a general account of the Reception of
Roman law: customarysystems of law are very much disposed to borrow
from a mature,detailedsystem in writingeven when the latteris constructed
on very different lines and was createdfor very different social, economic
and political conditions. But the borrowings may be very slow and
piecemeal. The reasons are not hardto find.
What is in issue here, in fact, is not that England did not borrow from
Roman law when others were doing so-it also did -but the question is
why England alone did not come to accept the Corpus Juris Civilis as
authoritative.We have alreadyseen partof the answer. Lands prominentin
the Reception had particularreasons for accepting the Corpus Juris as
authoritative.And for a long time Englandwas not so differentfrom other
territories.But more must be said to explain why, in the result, Englandwas
the odd-man-out.
Before we do that, though, a word must be said aboutRoman law in later

71. For this see in English, A. Watson, Sources of Law, supranote 57 at 28ff.
72. G. T. Turner and T. F. T. Plucknett, eds., Brevia Placitata, Selden Society, 66,
(London, 1951).
73. E. Shanks and S. F. C. Milsom, eds., Novae Narrationes, Selden Society, 80,
(London, 1963).
74. J. M. Kaye, ed., Placitata Coronae, Selden Society, Supp. Ser., iv, (London, 1966).
75. F. W. Maitland, ed., Court Baron, Selden Society, 4, (London, 1890).
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England. In the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesthere was an upsurgeof
the influence of Roman law, particularlyin substance.It is this which lends
some credence to the paragraphof Craig set out at the beginning of this
section. But after Bracton there was never a danger of a Reception in the
sense of the CorpusJuris Civilis becoming authoritative.76
A fourthpoint to be emphasizedis that, before the CorpusJuris Civilis is
treatedas the law of the land or as directly and highly persuasive, Roman
law is influential and infiltrates other systems by filling the gaps. The
greaterthe gaps the greaterthe potentialfor Roman law influence. As Craig
(1.2.14) puts it: 'In Scotlandthereis the greatestscarcityof writtenlaws and
therefore,naturally,in most matterswe follow the Civil Law. Not because
we are learned or well-groundedin it, because to this point no one-so far
as I am aware-were professorsof law who taughtlaw publicly (which is of
course to be regretted),but almost againstour will, since we are deprivedof
our own writtenlaw we are led thereby the sole beneficence of natureor the
worth of that law.'
Here we are, of course, speaking of privatelaw, the sphere in which lay
the achievement of the Romans. But English private law developed
precociously. Statutes were very importantfor private law from an early
date. Thus, HenryII (1154-89) can be characterizedas 'a greatlegislator'77
and EdwardI (1272-1307) was responsiblefor some of the most important
laws in English history.78Maitland, indeed, goes so far as to say: 'The
vigorous legislation of the time has an importantconsequence in checking
the growth of unenactedlaw.'79 This consequence, he believes is revealed
both in the check to the further advance of Roman law which had been
growing in importanceunderHenryIII (1216-72) and in hamperingfurther
developmentby case law. And early therewas developed a system of King's
courts, applying the same law through the country. National courts, as
distinctfrom local courts, apply to far more people: thereare more cases and
relevant law is more readily established. And, as we shall see, precedent
was regardedearly on as importantin England for fixing the law.
The mentionof the King's courtsbringsus to a fifth point, the writ system
which has Anglo-Saxon roots.80The need to have a writ to bring the cause
before the court meantthat high prioritywas centeredon that and on proof,
76. See, e.g., W. Holdsworth,History of English Law (London, 3rd ed., 1945) iv: 283ff;
B. P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England (Oxford, 1973) 122ff; J. H. Baker,
Introductionto English Legal History, (London, 2nd ed., 1979) 36f. [hereinaftercited
as Baker, Introduction]. Significantly, Milsom does not mention any danger of a
Reception in that period:Foundations, supranote 2.
77. F. W. Maitland,ConstitutionalHistory of England (Cambridge, 1920) 10 [hereinafter
cited as Maitland,History].
78. Ibid. at 18ff.
79. Ibid. at 21.
80. See, e.g., R. C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English CommonLaw (Cambridge,
1973) 30.
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ratherthanon systematicdevelopmentof legal rules. S. F. C. Milsom goes
so far as to claim thatfrom, say, the thirteenthto the early sixteenthcentury
the lawyers did not see the law as a system of substantiverules at all, and
he contraststhem with Bractonand his kind who 'were accustomedto think
in terms of substantivelaw'. But Bracton's was the last English law-book
for centuries to be written with such terms in mind.81 With such a
frameworkthe infiltrationof Roman law would be no easy matter.It could
either take the citadel by storm-which did not happen-or leave the field.
And the emphasis in Englandon what happenedin court led early to the
high practical standing of precedent. Craig (1.7.20) says: 'If nothing is
settled by the principles of the common law or by custom (general or
manorial)then in similar cases the authorityof previous decisions, especially of the King's Bench, prevails. And now disputesare settled primarily
in this way if it is shown that it was previously decided otherwise. Nor is
thereany defense to this form of judging unless the case can be distinguished
for it very often happensthat the whole situationof fact for the decision is
changedby minutecircumstancesof fact. Hence come the many volumes of
cases (for so the situations of fact are called) in Plowden, in Dyer and
others.' And he demonstratesthe ratherlower value of precedentin Scotland
(1.8.13,14,15). Yet Scotland, along with England, were the main countries
where institutionalwriters cited precedentas authorityfor propositionsof
law.82This is as trueof Lord Stair, Institutionsof the Law of Scotland (first
edition 1681) as of John Cowell, InstitutionesIuris Anglicani (first edition
1605). But even much earlier, Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae of the thirteenthcentury (now thoughtto have been written in the
1220s and 1230s and brought up to date by Bracton in the 1240s and
1250s)83contains about 500 referencesto decided cases. Case law was an
importantsourceof legal growthin the reign of HenryIII (1216-72) and the
first Year Books, the earliest English law reports, date from 1292.
The use of precedentalso militatesagainstthe infiltrationof Roman law.
First, there are fewer gaps to be filled. Secondly, gaps can be filled by
analogy with previouscases. Thirdly,wherejudges are given the high social
status of lawmakers-even if they talk as if their role was that of
law-finders-they will bolster theirown position and prestigeby relying on
the authorityof otherjudges ratherthan looking elsewhere for authority.
One final factor which is by no means the least importantand which
perhapsdeserves pride of place for Englandbeing differentfrom the other
states of western Europe in its attitudeto Roman law is feudalism and the
different standingof feudal law in England.
To begin with, feudalismby its very natureought to operateas a powerful
81. Foundations, supranote 2 at 43f.
82. But elsewhere, too, an institutionalwritermight refer to precedent.A notableexample
from southernFranceis ClaudeSerres,Les Institutionsdu droitfrancois suivantl'ordre
de celles de Justinien (Montpellier, 1753).
83. See, e.g., Baker, Introduction,supranote 76 at 101.
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barrierto the encroachmentof Romanlaw. The law flowing from feudalism
affects the most powerful interests. Landholdingis central to the feudal
system, and land was the basis of wealth in the Middle Ages. The feudal
relationshipwas primarilyknightly and military. Wealth and high social
status go together in ensuringthat legal rules deriving from feudalism will
have a majorimpacton law in general. But the concepts and categories that
flow naturallyfrom feudalisminto feudal law cut acrossthose of Romanlaw
to such an extent that they make Roman law seem irrelevantwithin their
sphere of influence. Thus, firstly, by its very naturefeudal law makes no
distinctionbetween public and private law, partakingof both, whereas the
foremostdistinctionin Roman law is into public and private, with the stress
almost entirely on the latter. As Maitland puts it, 'we may describe
"feudalism" as a state of society in which all or a greatpartof public rights
andduties are inextricablylinkedwith the tenureof land, in which the whole
governmental system-financial, military, judicial-is part of the law of
privateproperty'.84Secondly, for the law of persons in feudal law the most
importantdivision is into lord and vassal, a division that has no place in
Roman law. Thirdly and more importantly,fealty, a centralelement in the
feudal system, is an obligation or one side of an obligation or partly an
obligation. But it does not fit neatly into Roman notions: looked at from a
Romanistpoint of view it is in some sense a contractbut it has very different
effects from contract. Moreover, the other contractswhich are so familiar
from Roman law have no role to play in feudal law. Fourthly, Roman law,
especially as set out in the Corpus Juris Civilis, made scarcely any
distinction between land and moveable property. But for feudal law, only
land was usually relevant. Moreover, the feudal grant of land in England
was for an estate in the land, a time in the land, and not of ownership. The
whole doctrineof estates as it was to develop was unknownto Roman law.
In addition the acquisition of an estate involved a formal ceremony, of
fealty, and such ceremonieswere unknownto the CorpusJuris. Fifthly, the
natureof the feudal granthad an automaticimpacton the law of succession.
Since originally an estate in land ended on death there would be no feudal
succession to land. Gradually, it came to be expected that the lord would
renew. Still, this would mean in the case of land that there would be no
testate succession: the lord would not want the vassal to have a right of
choosing the next vassal. Also it would mean that primogeniturewould be
favored: the lord would not want the vassal's obligations to him to be
divided among a numberof people. And there would be a preferencefor
males:the main obligationof the vassal was militaryservice which could not
be performed by a female. These characteristicsare very different from
those of Roman law, where testacy was freely permitted, where no
distinctionswere drawnfor inheritancebetween land and movables, where
there was no primogenitureand where for the most part male and female
were equally entitledto inherit, both undera will and on intestacy. Thus, in
84. Maitland,History, supra note 77 at 23f.
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all branchesof substantivelaw, feudal law presenteda very different face
from Romanlaw. In addition,in all feudal relationsthe superiorretainedthe
power of jurisdictionover his vassal.85The more importantfeudal law was
in a society, the greaterthe obstacle it presentedagainst the Corpus Juris
becoming authoritative.
But feudal law was bound to have a greater impact in England than
elsewhere. On the one hand, it was only in England that land holding
involved the doctrine of estates that resulted in so much convoluted legal
reasoning and learning. Such was the overwhelming importanceof this
subjectthatit is scarcelysurprisingthatMilsom can say that 'Littletoncould
write his Tenures, which can properlybe regardedas a text-book of land
law, nearlyfour centuriesbefore text-bookswere writtenon otherbranches
of the law'.86But such massive emphasison a topic where Roman law was
irrelevantwould reducethe generalauthorityof Romanlaw. And borrowing
is often from a system which has achieved generalrespect. Moreover,pride
in one native English achievementwould increasethe native self-confidence
to go it alone in other fields of law. On the other hand, England, with
Normandyand Brittanyfollowing hardupon, was the only territorywhere
all of the land was held in feudal tenure. Where land is allodial, or not in
feudal tenure, non-feudal principles will determine ownership, transfer,
rights of succession and so on. Another system will have to apply, and
Romanlaw is an obvious resource.On this argumentit is not surprisingthat
at the time of the FrenchRevolution, Normandyand Brittanyhad received
relatively little of Roman law. And it is consistent with this argumentthat
Frieslandwhose law was notoriouslymore Romanizedthanthe otherUnited
Provinceshad relativelymore of its land held allodially thanhad the others.
In a very different way feudal law would be more of a barrierto the
penetrationof Roman law in Englandthan elsewhere. The Libri Feudorum
are the greatest monuments of the feudal law and seem to have been
composed mainly in Milan in the first half of the twelfth century. A second
version contained constitutions of the EmperorFrederickI, dating from
1154 and 1158. Hugolinus, the Bolognese jurist, completed a thirdversion
and the books acquireda semi-official status87when he inserted it in the
volumen parvum which contained the Institutes and the Authenticum (a
version of the Novellae) of the Corpus Juris. In fact it was treated as an
appendix to the nine collationes of the Authenticumand hence was even
called the tenth, decem collatio. It was glossed like the partsof the Corpus
Juris Civilis-that name is later-and the gloss was acceptedinto the Glossa
Ordinariaof Accursius. Its fate and fortune was thus linked with those of
the CorpusJuris. It was even taughtalong with it, and the same celebrated

85. See, e.g., Craig, Jus Feudale, 1.9.3.6.
86. Foundations, supranote 2 at 3f.
87. See, e.g., General Surveyof Events, Sources, Persons and Movementsin Continental
Legal History by various Europeanauthors(Boston, 1912) 74 (by C. Calisse).
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Europeanscholars like Cuiacius, Baldus, Julius Clarus, Hotman, wrote on
both.
But this linking of the Libri Feudorum with the Corpus Juris Civilis
would restrict the impact of feudalism to feudal law. To begin with, the
elements of the CorpusJuris, in particularthe Digest and Code, had such a
high status and were so detailed that the Libri Feudorum could scarcely
encroach. Then again, the Libri Feudorum were much less detailed, and
treatingthem with the Corpus Juris would result in the gaps, inconsistencies, ambiguities in the Libri Feudorum being resolved or filled by the
Corpus Juris. Craig, 1.9.36 puts it this way in discussing the nine
characteristicqualitiesof feus (1.9.36): 'Third, any point in relationto a feu
which is not expressly settled in the LibriFeudorumought to be decided by
the Jus Civile or the law of the Romans. Feudaldecisions, on the otherhand,
have no relevance except in relation to feudal questions.'
Again, and even more significantly, with this continentalattitudetowards
the Libri Feudorum and feudal law, when feudalism as a social system
declined, as it began to do early with the decline of knight service, there
would be no obstacle from feudal law to using the rules and categoriesof the
CorpusJuris to develop the local law.
But the Libri Feudorumwere used in this way only in continentalEurope
and in Scotland: not in England. There is no trace of their ever having
influence on English law, and no sign of any knowledge of them in English
works such as Littleton on Tenures. But where the Libri Feudorum,
restrictedand reined in by the CorpusJuris, were not used, there were not
these obstacles to feudal law dominatingthe legal scene and hinderinglegal
growth on other principles, and to remainingdominantlong afterfeudalism
itself had declined.
As we have seen, there is a strongtendencyfor legal rules, structuresand
concepts to continuein life long afterthe social structurehas died. So it was
with feudal law in Englandafterthe deathof feudalism. And feudal law was
the dominant part of English law, and its ideas were very different from
those of Roman law.
Feudal law was thus a majorfactor in preventingthe CorpusJuris from
becoming authoritativein England while being much less of an obstacle
elsewhere. I am temptedby a paradox:it was above all the failureto receive
the CorpusJuris Civilis as authoritativein Englandthat led to the failure in
Englandto accept the CorpusJuris Civilis as authoritative.The steps in the
paradox are: failure to receive the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative
involves the failure to receive the Libri Feudorum as authoritative:at a
certain stage in Western Europeanhistory feudalism, and with it the legal
rules relatingto the feudal system, is very potent for development;rules of
feudal law cut across the notions of Roman law; for the rest of Western
Europe the most importantideas of feudal law are contained in the Libri
Feudorum; where the Corpus Juris Civilis is treated as authoritative,the
Libri Feudorum are appended to it and treated as subsidiary; it is this
relationship which keeps feudal law to its proper sphere, and causes its
decline when feudalism declines.
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IV

In the fourth chapter of The Evolution of Law I tried to show how the
themes of the three preceding chapters-the importance of the legal tradition
itself for legal development, the nature of customary law and the Reception
of Roman law-come
together in Western legal history, choosing as an
example a single Scottish case of the seventeenth century in which the legal
discussion centered on the corresponding provisions of Roman law although
they were not economically appropriate and were not a necessary part of
Scots law. Judging is rooted in the legal tradition to the neglect of local
societal conditions. No legal case, I maintained, can be understood as law
in action if one neglects the legal tradition that sets the parameters of debate.
The tradition is not noticed by the actors who live it, and they are unaware
of its impact. They know not what they do.
Elsewhere I have given examples from other systems where to outsiders
judges acted in an extreme way and obtained inappropriate results, but
where the judges thought of themselves as good judges acting out the rules
of the judging game according to their own particular tradition.88
Naturally enough, courts such as those in Scotland and South Africa, do
not always show themselves to be unaware of changed circumstances when
they reason from Roman or Roman-Dutch law. But even then the legal
culture may also emerge clearly. I should like to cite an example from
Scotland, Halkerston v. Wedderburn of 1781:
Mr. Halkerston,thinkinghis gardenat Invereskinjuredby a row of elms, the branches
of which hung over it from the garden of Mr. Wedderburn,applied to the Sheriff for
redress. After various steps of procedure,the cause was moved to the Courtof Session
by advocation; when the following abstract question came to be considered, viz.
Whethera person is boundto allow his propertyto be overshadedby the trees belonging
to a conterminousheritor?
Pleaded for Mr. Wedderburn;The climate of Scotland is such as has induced the
legislature to encourage the planting of forest-trees in hedge rows, for the sake of
shelter;and, for some time, it was even imposed as a duty upon every proprietor;act
1661, cap. 41. This, however, would have been an elusory enactment, if the common
law permitted a conterminous heritor to lop such trees, whenever their branches
extended beyond the line of march. By the common law, an heritormay plant so near
the march, in praediis rusticis, that the trees will protrudetheir branches into the air,
over the adjacent ground; nor is there any thing in that law, which authorises the
conterminousheritorto lop off such branches, unless he can qualify a materialdamage
arising from their protrusion.
In England, as well as in Scotland, the highways are understoodto be vested in the
King, for behoof of the public;yet in bothkingdoms, statuteshave been found necessary
to authorizeJustices of the Peace, Way-wardens,&c. to cause prunetrees hanging over
the road; which could not have been the case, had the common law allowed any such
power to a conterminousheritor.
In like manner,thoughthe Roman law allowed the proprietorof a praediumrusticum
to prune such trees to the height of fifteen feet, yet this was not a right inherentin him
upon the principlesof common law, but was derivedfrom the laws of the twelve tables,
88. 'A House of Lords Judgement,and Other Tales of the Absurd', AmericanJournal of
ComparativeLaw (1985), 673ff.
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and confirmedby an edict of the Praetor;L.I.?7, 8, 9. D. De arb. caed. And this very
limitationof the right shews, that the Romans did not think the protrusionof branches
in itself any encroachmentupon the right of property;except so far as it obstructedor
impeded the immediate exercise of it. They considered the air as a res communis,
incapableof appropriation;and thought, that no encroachmentupon it affordeda proper
ground of challenge.
Answered for Mr. Halkerston;It is understoodto be a general rule of law, that no
person is entitled to encroachupon the propertyof another,unless he can show a right
of servitude to that effect. One may dig a trench upon his own property, though the
effect of it may be, to cut the roots, and destroy the whole of his neighbour'strees. He
may raise his wall to any given height; and, in doing so, he may cut down every branch
that stands in his way. While a branchfrom his neighbour'stree does him no harm, he
will allow it to remain, upon the same principleof good neighborhood,that he allows
him to hunt over his fields, or to angle in his stream. But the momentthis branchdoes
him a real or an imaginaryinjury;whenever, in short, he wishes to remove it, the law
entitles him to do so, in the same manner, and upon the same principles, that it entitles
him to protect his propertyfrom any other kind of encroachment.
The regulationsfor the encouragementof planting and inclosing, introducedby the
act 1661, can never apply, with any propriety,to two contiguous gardensin the village
of Inveresk;and it is not very obvious how the powers given by statute to the public
officers entrustedwith the care of high-ways, at all derogate from the private right of
parties to demand what they are empowered to do.
Neitherdoes the argumenton the other side derive any supportfrom the Roman law.
The edict referred to, related only to praedia rustica; but, where a similar
encroachmentwas made upon a praedium urbanum,as seems more properlyto be the
case here, anotheredict of the Praetorauthorisedthe whole tree to be cut down; L. I.
? 2. D. De arb. caed. At any rate, it is nothingto us, in what mannerthe Romanschose
to limit the naturalright now contendedfor. Under an Italiansun, it might probablybe
thought, that there could not be too much shade; but the same idea can never be
entertainedin a northernclimate; and, accordingly, the learned Groenwegen, in his
treatise, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, says
expressly, 'Si arborfundo, vel aedibus alienis impendeat,nostris et Gallorummoribus,
non totam arborem a stirpe exscindere sed id quod super excurrit in totum adimere
licet; tit. De arb. caed.'
The Court had no doubt upon the principle; and, therefore, adhered to the Lord
Ordinary'sinterlocutor,'Remittingthe cause to the Sheriff, with this instruction,thathe
find Mr. Wedderburnis boundto prunehis trees in such a manner,as they may not hang
over the mutual wall, and thereby be of prejudice to Mr. Halkerston's fruit and
garden.'89

As is usual for the time the advocates' arguments are given much more
prominence than the judges' reasoning. For the defender maintaining his
right to have his trees overhang and overshadow the pursuer's garden it was
argued that there was no obstacle thereto at Roman common law; though it
was conceded that by statute, namely the XII Tables, the aggrieved
neighbor could prune such trees up to fifteen feet from the ground, and that
this was confirmed by edict. This distinction between common law and
statute is based on the notion that statute is an encroachment and ought to
be interpreted strictly. The notion itself came into Scots law from England
and was unknown to the Romans. The argument is a blending of the two
foreign elements in Scots law: the scope of a Roman rule should better be

89. Halkerstonv. Wedderburn(1781) M. 10495.
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determinedby Roman principles, not by much later English ideas. In fact
the XII Tables, the codification of the fifth centuryB.C., was regardedas
the foundation of all Roman law.90 Thus, the defender wants to give as
restricteda scope as possible to the Roman rules, but never does he argue
that they ought to be treatedas irrelevant.Yet Roman law was not the law
in Scotland, though it could be treatedas of great authority.
The argumentfor the pursueris of more interestfor us. First it is claimed
that in fact underthe edict, the overhungneighborhad full rightto cut down
the offending tree. Then comes the argumentfrom changed circumstances.
Even if, it is suggested, the Romans did restrictthe right to prune or cut
down overhangingtrees, that is of no relevance for Scotland: 'Under an
Italiansun, it might probablybe thought, that there could not be too much
shade;but the same idea can neverbe entertainedin a northernclimate.' Yet
the presumptionthatRomanlaw applieshas to be rebuttedby legal authority
and since there was none for Scotland9lthe pursuerlooks to Holland and
France: 'If a tree overhangs another's land or buildings, then, by our and
Frenchcustom it is not permittedto cut out the whole tree from the root, but
to remove completely what overhangs.' This quotation he takes very
significantly from Groenewegen, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in
Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, (1649) a work which as the title shows is
dedicatedto setting out the Roman rules which were not accepted or were
abrogatedin Holland and neighboringterritories.92
V

The conclusions of this paper remain those that I drew in chapter five
of The Evolutionof Law. Legal change comes about throughthe cultureof
the legal elite, the law makers, and it is above all determined by that
culture.
But law is not the culture of the legal elite alone and it is not the only
culture of the legal elite. As to the first of these, law is also the cultural
heritageof otherlawyers and of society at large. But to effect change, other
lawyers and other membersof society have to operate on and throughthe
legal elite, whereas the elite can initiate change on its own.93
As to the second of these, the law-making elite also partakes of the
general cultureof society. Thus, where the society as a whole or its ruling
elite is cosmopolitan or innovative, the law making elite will tend to be
90. See e.g. D. 1.2.2.6; Cicero, de oratore, 1.44.195.
91. On the paucity of Scottish authoritysee J. Rankine, The Law of Land-ownershipin
Scotland (Edinburgh,4th ed., 1909) 631ff.
92. For a South African case in which changed circumstances-this time of law-were
taken into account see Simons and Others v. Board of Executors 1915 C.P.D. 479.
93. See alreadyA. Watson, 'Legal Change:Sourcesof Law and Legal Culture', University
of PennsylvaniaLaw Review 131 (1983) 1121ff, especially at 1151ff.
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cosmopolitan or innovative. The general culture has many strands and
many roots, resulting from geography, history, economics, politics,
religion and so on and it is as part of the general culture that these factors
influence law making. But what has to be stressed is, as we have seen, the
very powerful role that the legal culture itself has on law making. The
law-making elite comes to regard law as existing in large measure in its
own right, as an end in itself, as having its being distinct from other
institutions of society.

Legal change also comes aboutby organizedpressurefrom outside of the
legal elite. But when it does, the emerging law is still given its contoursby
the law-makingelite.94
Two restrictionson all of the above should be set forth right at the end of
this paperso thattheirimportanceshould not be ignored. The first is thatthe
argumenthere is not that the law-makingelite is never aware of, and fully
responsiveto, wider societal conditions. It may well be, and the legal rules
on a particulartopic may well be entirely satisfactoryfor those making use
of them. It may be for instance that at times the business community will
have such close contacts with some part of the legal elite in the shape of
academicswhom it hires as consultantsthattheirconcerns are very much the
same, and a view of law is proferredwhich is in harmonywith commercial
interests. Even then, of course, in a developed system that view of law put
forwardby academicswill prevailonly if it is also adoptedby judges and the
legislaturewho, in their turn, are also of course blinkeredby their own part
of the tradition.My point is only that it is the legal elite who shape the legal
rules, that they are fixed within their culturaltradition, and that to a very
considerableextent the rules often do not meet the needs and desires of those
who use them and that that is not a matterof immediateconcern to the legal
elite. No better illustrationof this can be found than in English land law
which for centuries until 1925 (at the earliest) was very unsatisfactoryfor
land owners and was beneficial to no one (except practisinglawyers). Those
who had no propertyhad no concern with the rules, those who had were also
those who as judges and legislators were in a position to change the rules.
But (in Oliver Cromwell's phrase) the 'tortuous and ungodly jumble' of
English land law was to prevailfor centuries.95A glance at the confused and
unsatisfactorystate of the law (for those using it) in the contemporaryU.S.
on copyright infringementwith regard to the fair use of factual works96
should point a warning to those who believe American law is in harmony
with the needs of law users.
The second restrictionought not to need mentioning; I am concerned
with the developmentof the legal rules themselves, not with how the legal
94. See already A. Watson, 'Comparative Law and Legal Change', Cambridge Law
Journal 37 (1978) 313ff.
95. For the argumentsee A. Watson, Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh,1977) 47ff.
96. See G. Francione, 'Facing the Nation: The Standardsfor Copyright,Infringementand
Fair Use of Factual Works', 134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 519ff
(1986).
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rules operatein society. For reasonsat least partlyconnectedwith the wider
society, the same legal rule may operate to different effect in different
societies. The presentpaperis writtenon the premisethat actuallegal rules,
as authoritativelyset forth, have themselves an impact.97

97. See alreadyWatson, 'Legal Change', supra note 95 at 1138f.

